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Keith B. Hall† 
I. LEGISLATION AMENDS LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 212.21 
Act No. 227 of the 2020 Regular Session of the Louisiana 
Legislature amends Louisiana Mineral Code article 212.21 (also 
known as Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:212.21).1 In particular, Act 
No. 227 amends article 212.21 to clarify that the article does not apply 
to claims brought by unleased owners—that is, landowners2 or mineral 




†Keith B. Hall is the Campanile Charities Professor of Energy Law at Louisiana 
State University, where he also serves as Director of the Mineral Law Institute and 
Director of the John P. Laborde Energy Law Center. Professor Hall teaches courses 
such as Mineral Rights; International Petroleum Transactions; Energy Law and 
Regulation; and Civil Law Property. Before joining LSU, he practiced law at a major 
firm in New Orleans, where he served as Co-Chair of the firm’s Energy Law Practice 
Group. 
 1. H.B. 227, 2020 Reg. Sess. (La. 2020).  
 2. H.B. 227, 2020 Reg. Sess. (La. 2020). In Louisiana, as in the rest of the 
United States, the general rule is that the landowner owns the right to use the land 
and its subsurface to explore for and produce oil and gas, and to own whatever oil 
and gas he or she produces, assuming that the landowner or a predecessor-in-interest 
has not granted that right to someone else. See LA. REV. STAT. 31:6. 
 3. Louisiana does not recognize the concept of a severed mineral estate. See 
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To understand this amendment and its significance, it is helpful to 
know a little about Mineral Code articles 212.21 through 212.23.  
These articles were enacted in a 1982 amendment to the Louisiana 
Mineral Code.4  The articles are patterned on Mineral Code articles 
137 through 140—a portion of the original Mineral Code that governs 
claims by a mineral lessor who seeks relief from the lessee for a failure 
“to make timely or proper payment of royalties” due under the lease. 
The articles establish certain procedures as a prerequisite for lessors 
asserting a claim, such as providing written notice to the lessee and 
waiting at least thirty days after delivery of such notice before filing 
suit.5 In certain circumstances, articles 139 and 140 also authorize a 
court to enter a judgment including enhanced remedies that are greater 
than the royalties due, such as judgments requiring the payment of 
interest, attorney’s fees, and “damages” up to “double the amount of 
royalties due.”6 
Articles 212.21 through 212.23 were enacted to establish a similar 
procedure and to authorize similar enhanced remedies for claims by 
“the owner of a mineral production payment or a royalty owner other 
than a mineral lessor . . . for the failure of a mineral lessee to make 
timely or proper payment of royalties or the production payment.” 
Article 212.21 requires that such a person “must give his obligor 
written notice of such failure as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for 
damages.” Article 212.22 provides that “[t]he obligor shall have thirty 
days after receipt of the required notice within which to pay the 
royalties or production payments due or to respond by stating in 
writing a reasonable cause for nonpayment.” Article 212.23 then 
specifies the consequences if the obligor does neither of these things. 
In some circumstances, the consequences require the obligor pay 
interest, attorney’s fees, and “damages double the amount due.” 
 
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1922); Wemple 
v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668–69 (La. 1923). However, a landowner 
may grant a mineral servitude in favor of another person. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:24 
(1975). A mineral servitude, while it exists, is somewhat like a severed mineral 
estate. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (1975) (“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment 
of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals 
and reducing them to possession and ownership.”). The major practical distinction 
between a severed mineral estate and a mineral servitude is that a severed mineral 
estate may constitute a permanent severance of mineral rights from land ownership, 
but a mineral servitude terminates if it is not used for any period of ten consecutive 
years. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27 (1975). (“A mineral servitude is extinguished by … 
prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years … “). 
 4. Acts 1982, No. 249, § 1, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:212.21–23 (1982). 
 5. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:137 (1975). 
 6. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:139–140 (1975). 
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Sometimes parties dispute whether a landowner or mineral 
servitude owner whose interest in minerals in a compulsory drilling 
unit is unleased can utilize these statutes. The statutes, as noted above, 
apply in favor of “the owner of a mineral production payment or a 
royalty owner other than a mineral lessor.” A landowner or mineral 
servitude owner would not seem to qualify as “a royalty owner other 
than a mineral lessor.” The word “royalty” is used in three main ways. 
First, under oil and gas leases, the mineral lessor is owed a lessor’s 
royalty,7 but a landowner or mineral servitude owner whose interest is 
not leased would not be entitled to a lessor’s royalty under an oil and 
gas lease. Second, Mineral Code article 80 defines “mineral royalty” 
as a right that is carved out of a landowner’s or mineral servitude 
owner’s interest in minerals in favor of some other person.8 Third, 
persons in the oil and gas industry sometimes establish an “overriding 
royalty,” which is an interest that is carved out of the mineral lessee’s 
interest.9 Obviously, if no lease covers the landowner’s or mineral 
servitude owner’s interest, there will not be a mineral lessee from 
whose working interest an overriding royalty can be carved.  
That left only the possibility that a landowner or mineral servitude 
owner could be the owner of a “mineral production payment.” The 
Mineral Code does not define “mineral production payment,” but 
“production payment” is commonly used in the oil and gas industry to 
refer to a person’s right to receive a fraction of the value of production, 
free of costs, with the interest carved out of the lessee’s interest.10 
Used this way, the term “production payment” has a meaning similar 
to “overriding royalty.” However, once an overriding royalty is 
established, it typically lasts for the life of the lease, but a “production 
payment” often terminates automatically once the owner of it has 
recovered a specified amount of money.11  
There is a strong argument that this was the appropriate meaning of 
“production payment” for purposes of article 212.21.12 If such a 
meaning is applied for purposes of Mineral Code article 212.1, the 
 
 7. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213 (1983). 
 8. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:80 (1975). 
 9. See, e.g., id. § 31:126 cmt. (referring to overriding royalties as being carved 
out of the “working interest,” which is the lessee’s right to conduct operations under 
a lease). 
 10. See, e.g., PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS 
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1396 (17th ed. 2018)1 (definition of “production 
payment”).   
 11. Id. at 1233, 1396 (definition of “overriding royalty”). 
 12. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 11 (1988) (“Words of art and technical terms must be 
given their technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter.”). 
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owner of an unleased interest would not be the owner of a mineral 
production payment. Two federal courts interpreted the statute this 
way, holding that unleased owners were not entitled to use Mineral 
Code article 212.21.13 Act No. 227 revises Mineral Code article 
212.21 to codify the holdings of these federal cases that articles 212.21 
through 212.23 do not apply to an unleased landowner’s or mineral 
servitude owner’s right to a share of unit production. The 
pre-amendment language of article 212.21 states: 
 
If the owner of a mineral production payment or a 
royalty owner other than a mineral lessor seeks relief 
for the failure of a mineral lessee to make timely or 
proper payment of royalties or the production payment, 
he must give his obligor written notice of such failure 
as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages. 
 
The amendment removed “mineral” from the phrase “mineral 
production payment” and added the phrase “created out of a mineral 
lessee’s interest” as follows: 
 
If the owner of a mineral production payment created 
out of a mineral lessee’s interest or a royalty owner 
other than a mineral lessor seeks relief for the failure of 
a mineral lessee to make timely or proper payment of 
royalties or the production payment, he must give his 
obligor written notice of such failure as a prerequisite 
to a judicial demand for damages.14 
 
The change is significant because “production payment” is commonly 
understood as being an interest carved out of the lessee’s interest. 
Further, the addition of the phrase “created out of a mineral lessee’s 
interest” expressly provides for this meaning and therefore precludes 





 13. Adams v. Chesapeake Operating Co., 561 Fed. Appx. 322, 326 (5th Cir. 
2014); J&L Family, L.L.C. v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Props., 293 F. Supp. 3d 615, 
620 (W.D. La. 2018). 
 14. H.B. 227, Reg. Sess. (La. 2020). 
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II. LOUISIANA’S OFFICE OF CONSERVATION SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVES 
MANAGEMENT OF ACTIVE & ORPHAN WELLS15  
In 2014, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor (the “Auditor”) issued a 
report on the management of active and orphan wells16 by Louisiana’s 
Office of Conservation (“Conservation”).17 The Auditor concluded 
that: (1) Conservation was not conducting a sufficient number of 
inspections of wells; (2) there were too many wells for which 
Conservation did not require financial assurance (security to ensure 
wells are properly plugged and abandonded at the end of the wells’ 
lives); (3) when financial assurance was required, that the amount 
often was too low; and (4) Conservation lacked an effective program 
for dealing with operators’ failures to comply with regulations.18 The 
Auditor made twenty-one recommendations.19 
In March 2020, the Auditor released a follow-up report that 
examined Conservation’s progress toward complying with the 
recommendations the Auditor made in 2014.20 The Auditor found that 
Conservation had fully or partially implemented all twenty-one 
recommendations.21 For example, the fraction of wells that 
Conservation requires financial assurance increased from 25% to 
66.3% of wells, and Conservation increased the amount of financial 
assurance required.22 Conservation improved its inspection process 
and developed procedures that specify when the agency should issue 
compliance orders and impose penalties for active wells that fail 
 
 15. See generally LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:4 (2018) (explaining that the Office of 
Conservation regulates oil and gas activities in Louisiana); see infra note 20, at 6.  
 16. See LA. DEPT. NAT. RES., Glossary of Terms, 
http://www.sonris.com/documents/FinalLouisianaDNRGlossaryofTerm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5DU-XZQW], (defining “orphan wells” as “[w]ells which have 
no continued useful purpose for the exploration, production, or development of oil 
and gas and which have been declared to be an orphaned oilfield site under R.S. 
30:91,” with this designation being declared pursuant to 30:91 when non financially 
responsible party with liability for the well can be found).  
 17. Daryl G. Purpera, Oil and Gas Regulation and Orphaned Wells: Office of 
Conservation – Dept. of Nat. Res., LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR (May 28, 2014) [hereinafter 
“2014 Report”], https://www.lla.la.gov/PublicReports.nsf/D6A0EBE279B83B9F8 
6257CE700506EAD/$FILE/000010BC.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A4Y-4ES6].  
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Id. at 6–28. 
 20. Daryl G. Purpera, Progress Report: Regulation of Oil and Gas Wells and 
Management of Orphaned Wells: Office of Conservation – Dept. of Nat. Res., LA. 
LEGIS. AUDITOR (Mar. 11, 2020) [hereinafter “2020 Report”], 
http://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf/0/C9D7297FEA93568D86258528006B
A4F8/$FILE/0001FA2E.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7BQ-H6WG]. 
 21. Id. at 1. 
 22. Id. at 2. 
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inspection. The procedures also specify when Conservation should 
conduct a re-inspection.23 Further, Conservation amended its 
regulations to ensure that operators schedule the plugging and 
abandonment of inactive wells that have no future utility, rather than 
delaying the plugging and abandonment by stating the wells have 
future utility.24 
However, the Auditor found that the Conservation’s management 
of wells should be improved further. For example, although the 
Conservation increased the amount of financial assurance required, 
that amount was still below the typical cost to plug and abandon a 
well.25 The Auditor found that, in 2019, the average cost to plug and 
abandon an onshore well less than 3,000 feet deep was about $4.76 
per foot but that the required financial assurance was only $2 per 
foot.26 The average cost to plug and abandon deeper, onshore wells 
was approximately $35.84 per foot but that the required financial 
assurance was $4 per foot.27 In addition, the Auditor found that the 
Conservation was not conducting enough re-inspections.28  
III. APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMS JUDGMENT REGARDING WHETHER 
DRILLING WAS PERFORMED IN GOOD FAITH 
In June 1996, Thomas Blount sold land to Cannisnia Plantation, 
LLC (“Cannisnia”), reserving a mineral servitude for one-half of all 
the oil and gas produced from the land.29  Mr. Blount later transferred 
the servitude to Blount Farms, LLC, which transferred it to Blount 
Company. Blount Company eventually transferred the servitude back 
to Blount Farms.30 This Article will refer to Mr. Blount, his father, 
Blount Farms, and Blount Company collectively as “the Blounts.” 
The Blounts apparently had no previous oil and gas experience, but 
they wanted to drill their own well. They hired an experienced 
geologist who developed a plan to drill a well through multiple 
potentially productive formations. The Blounts also consulted with 
other geologists, hired a drilling contractor, and obtained a permit to 
drill. They spudded the Cannisnia-Blount No. 1 well in March 2006 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Cannisnia Plantation, LLC v. Cecil Blount Farms, LLC, 293 So. 3d 157, 160 
(La. Ct. App. 2020). 
 30. Id. 
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and reached its total depth in April 2006. (In certain places in the 
opinion, the court erroneously refers to drilling or other operations 
occurring in “2016,” but the context of the reference indicates that the 
events occurred in 2006.) They logged the well and collected a core 
sample. The well was a dry hole, and the Blounts plugged it. 
Several years later, in early November 2014, Cannisnia sent notice 
to the Blounts, demanding (pursuant to Mineral Code article 206) that 
the Blounts furnish a recordable instrument stating that their servitude 
had terminated. The Blounts did not do so. In December 2014, 
Cannisnia filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the servitude 
had terminated, plus attorney fees and damages for the Blounts’ failure 
to acknowledge that the servitude had terminated. The Blounts 
answered and filed a reconventional demand in which they sought a 
declaratory judgment that the servitude had not terminated. 
Under Louisiana law, nonuse extinguishes a mineral servitude.31 
Prescription of nonuse is interrupted by “good faith” drilling.32 For 
drilling to be in “good faith” for purposes of Mineral Code article 29, 
the drilling “must be . . . commenced with reasonable expectation of 
discovering and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular 
point or depth,” and the drilling must be “continued at the site chosen 
to that point or depth.”33 When a landowner contends that a mineral 
servitude has terminated, the owner of the servitude has the burden of 
proving that there was an interruption of prescription.34  
At trial, four of the geologists with whom the Blounts had consulted 
gave testimony, stating that they believed there had been a reasonable 
expectation that the Blounts would find hydrocarbons in paying 
quantities at the depth they drilled.35 The evidence shows that the 
Blounts incurred about $160,000 in drilling expenses.36 The trial court 
entered judgment, holding that the servitude had not terminated.37 
Cannisnia appealed.38  
The Louisiana Second Circuit noted that prior Louisiana court 
decisions considered numerous factors in determining whether drilling 
was done in “good faith.” The court stated: 
 
 31. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1); see also Cannisnia, 293 So. 3d at 170.   
 32. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:29; see also Cannisnia, 293 So. 3d at 170.   
 33. Id. 
 34. Cannisnia, 293 So. 3d at 168 (citing Smith v. Andrews, 215 So. 3d 868 (La. 
Ct. App. 2017)). 
 35. Id. at 167. 
 36. Id. at 167, 172. 
 37. Id. at 167. 
 38. Id. 
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Some of these factors include the geology of the 
drilling site and surrounding area based upon prior 
wells and seismic data; the expertise and experience of 
the geologists, petroleum engineers, and oil men 
making the recommendations and decisions; the depth 
of review of the available geology; the timing of the 
lease and its terms; the expenses incurred in the 
operation; the permit applications; the various types of 
testing performed; the analysis of formations 
encountered during drilling; the keeping of well logs; 
the time put into drilling; the depth drilled; and the size 
of pipes used. This nonexclusive list, along with the 
credibility assessment of testimony given at trial, is to 
be weighed by the trial court in making the good faith 
determination.39 
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment.40 The 
appellate court noted that the trial court’s written reasons included a 
reference to Cannisnia not proving their case, but the appellate court 
concluded that this did not require reversal. It was not clear that the 
trial court had really placed the burden of proof on Cannisnia.41 
Further, when parties appeal, they appeal judgments, not the reasons 
for judgment, and here the record contained sufficient evidence to 
justify affirming the lower court’s judgment.42 In affirming the lower 
court’s judgment, the appellate court rejected suggestions that the 
Blounts’ sole reason for drilling the well was to interrupt 
prescription.43 
In his dissent, Judge Thompson expressed his opinion that the 
record did not contain sufficient evidence to show that the Blounts 
satisfied Louisiana’s objective standard for good faith, which requires 
a reasonable expectation of finding hydrocarbons in paying quantities, 
not merely a subjective belief that a well will produce hydrocarbons.44  
 
 39. Id. at 171 (citing Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 37 So. 3d 
1122, 1131 (La. Ct. App. 2010)).   
 40. Id. at 172. 
 41. Id. at 168. 
 42. Id. at 172. 
 43. Id. (“If the Blounts’ sole concern was the interruption of prescription, they 
could have drilled a shallower well and spent less time and money drilling.”). 
 44. Id. at 172–73. 
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IV. LIENS INVALID UNDER LOUISIANA OIL WELL LIEN ACT 
PADCO Energy Services, LLC and PADCO Pressure Control, LLC 
(collectively, “PADCO”) were companies that built “flowback units,” 
which are used at well sites during flowback—when hydraulic 
fracturing fluids are returning from the well bore.45 PADCO’s primary 
business was to rent these units to companies that worked on well 
completions.46 Case Energy Services, LLC (“Case”) sold piping and 
gauges to PADCO.47 Case delivered these items to PADCO’s place of 
business, and PADCO incorporated these items into the flowback 
units.48  
A dispute arose between PADCO and Case. Case filed suit in state 
court, alleging that PADCO did not pay the full price for the use of 
certain flowback units. Case also filed twenty-five liens in Louisiana 
pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”).49 In 
addition, Case filed ten liens in Texas based on a Texas statute. Each 
of the PADCO entities later entered bankruptcy, and Case’s state court 
action was stayed. PADCO filed adversary proceedings in the 
bankruptcies, seeking judgments that Case’s liens were invalid. 
PADCO sought summary judgment. 
Under LOWLA, certain persons are entitled to a lien.  These include 
“contractors,” with “contractor” defined as a person who contracts to 
perform “operations.”50  In turn, “operations” are defined to include 
various types of work performed “on a well site.”51  The court 
concluded that Case could not qualify as a “contractor” because it had 
not contracted to perform work at a well site.   
Persons who deliver movables to a well site can be entitled to a lien, 
but Case did not deliver its equipment to a well site. Case delivered 
the items to PADCO’s place of business. 
In addition, under LOWLA, a person who sells movables to an 
“operator” or “contractor” is entitled to a lien to secure payment of the 
purchase price for the movables, provided the movables are 
incorporated into the well, incorporated into a facility located on the 
well site, consumed in operations, or consumed by a person 
 
 45. In re PADCO Energy Services, LLC v. Case Energy Services, LLC, 610 
B.R. 96, 106 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2019). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 105. 
 48. Id. 
 49. The Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act is found at LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861–
9:4873 (2007). 
 50. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861–9:4862 (2007). 
 51. Id. § 9:4861. 
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performing work at the well site.52 Here, it was not clear that Case had 
sold movables to an “operator” or “contractor” when it sold items to 
PADCO. An “operator” is defined to mean a lessee who contracts with 
the claimant. PADCO was not a lessee and therefore was not an 
operator.  
The court then considered whether PADCO was a contractor.53 To 
be a “contractor” under LOWLA, a company must enter a contract to 
perform work at a well site. PADCO’s main business was simply 
renting equipment for use at a well site, not performing work at well 
sites. If PADCO did not contract to perform work at the well site, it 
would not be a contractor, and Case would not have a valid lien based 
on selling movables to a contractor. But Case managed to raise a 
genuine issue of fact regarding whether PADCO had agreed to 
perform work at the well site, so the court could not grant summary 
judgment based on PADCO not qualifying as a contractor.  
However, for Case’s liens to be valid under LOWLA based on a 
sale of movables to a contractor, the movables must have been 
incorporated into the well, incorporated into a facility located on the 
well site, consumed in operations, or consumed by a person 
performing work on the well site. The court concluded that Case’s 
liens did not satisfy this requirement. The piping and gauges sold by 
Case were not consumed. Further, they were not incorporated into the 
well. The movables sold by Case were incorporated into the flowback 
units that were temporarily placed on the lease tract, but the court 
concluded that this is not what was meant by Louisiana Revised 
Statutes 9:4861’s reference to a “facility located on the well site.” 
Therefore, PADCO was entitled to summary judgment because the 
twenty-five liens that Case filed in Louisiana were invalid.54  
The court stated that there was an additional, independent basis for 
summary judgment in favor of PADCO regarding Case’s Louisiana 
liens. In particular, the liens did not fairly apprise third persons of the 
nature of the liens because: (1) each lien stated that PADCO owed 
Case more than $1.2 million, but that amount was actually the total 
amount allegedly owed to Case (the individual liens each secured a 
much lower amount); and (2) the liens did not describe the work done 
by Case. The court stated that these deficiencies made these liens 
invalid.   
 
 52. Id. § 9:4862(A). 
 53. PADCO Energy Services, 610 B.R. at 106–07. 
 54. Id. at 114. 
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V. WELL COST REPORTING STATUTE 
B.A. Kelly Land Company, LLC (“Kelly”) was an owner of 
unleased land in two compulsory drilling and production units.55 
Aethon Energy became operator of the units in 2016.56 By then, 
numerous wells had reached payout.57 As an unleased owner, Kelly 
was entitled to its pro rata share of each well’s monthly revenue after 
payout, subject to a deduction of Kelly’s pro rata share of ongoing 
operating costs.58 Kelly sent multiple requests for information, and 
Aethon sent reports to Kelly. Kelly complained that the reports did not 
contain all the information Kelly was entitled to receive, but Aethon 
did not correct the problem.59 In September 2018, Kelly filed suit 
against Aethon based on Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:103.1 and 
103.2.60  
Revised Statute 30:103.1 provides that, when a compulsory drilling 
unit includes any land “upon which the operator or producer has no 
valid oil, gas, or mineral lease,” the owners of mineral interests in 
those lands have a right to receive specified types of information 
regarding costs and revenues from a unit well, though the statute has 
been interpreted so that the mineral interest owner’s right to receive 
the information does not arise until the owner requests such 
information.61  Revised Statute 30:103.2 provides that, if an operator 
fails to comply with 30:103.1, and the operator does not correct that 
failure within ninety days after a mineral interest owner notifies the 
operator of the failure, the operator loses their right to charge that for 
the owner’s share of certain drilling costs. 
Kelly alleged that Aethon’s reports failed to include the information 
required under Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:103.1 and that, pursuant 
to Revised Statute 30:103.2, the penalty for this failure was that 
Aethon forfeited its right to collect Kelly’s pro rata share of the wells’ 
operating costs.62 The court disagreed, concluding that Kelly’s 
 
 55. B.A. Kelly Land Co., LLC v. Aethon Energy Operating LLC, No. 5:18-CV-
01243, 2019 WL 5021267, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 9, 2019). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at *1–2. 
 60. Id. at *2. 
 61. Id. at *3 (citing Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 561 F. App’x 322, 
325 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
 62. Id. at *2. 
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correspondence was not sufficiently detailed to trigger liability under 
the statute.63 
VI. DUTY TO CORRECT INACCURATE PRODUCTION REPORTS  
Statoil USA E&P, Inc. held an oil and gas lease on the Outer 
Continental Shelf.64 In August 2010, the Office of Natural Resources 
Revenue (“ONRR”) found “significant volume variances” when 
comparing natural gas production information reported by Statoil to 
information supplied by gas-plant operators.65 ONRR sent an order to 
Statoil instructing the company to correct its reports within thirty 
days.66 Statoil did not comply.67  
ONRR contacted Statoil regarding the variances again in January 
2011 and May 2011.68 Statoil acknowledged that its prior reports were 
inaccurate, but it failed to correct them.69 In August 2011, ONRR 
threatened to impose penalties for a “knowing or willful failure to 
maintain accurate information.” Statoil still failed to correct its 
reports.70 
In February 2012, ONRR sent a notice of civil penalty to Statoil.71 
ONRR relied on 30 U.S.C. § 17119(d), which authorizes the 
imposition of a penalty against any person who “knowingly or 
willfully prepares, maintains, or submits false, inaccurate, or 
misleading reports, notices, affidavits, records, data, or other written 
information.”72 ONRR stated that the penalty was imposed for a 
“knowing and willful maintenance of incorrect information on gas 
sales volumes reported.”73  
Statoil challenged the penalty, arguing to an administrative law 
judge that the company had not “maintained” inaccurate reports 
because the reports were stored in ONRR’s online database.74 Thus, 
ONRR had “maintained” the data; Statoil had not. The administrative 
 
 63. Id. at *7. 
 64. Statoil USA E&P, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 801 F. Appx. 232, 235 (5th 
Cir. 2020). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.; 30 U.S.C. § 17119(d)(1) (2012). 
 73. Statoil USA E&P, Inc., 801 F. App’x at 235. 
 74. Id. 
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law judge rejected that argument.75 Statoil appealed to the Department 
of Interior’s Board of Land Appeals, but the Board affirmed.76 Statoil 
appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas, but the district court affirmed.77 Statoil then appealed to the 
United States Fifth Circuit.78 
The Fifth Circuit also rejected Statoil’s arguments and affirmed. 
The court noted that, in the Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, one meaning of “maintain” is “to keep in a state of repair, 
efficiency, or validity.”79 The court concluded that for purposes of 30 
U.S.C. § 1719(d), a lessee must correct reports that they know are 
false, inaccurate, or misleading to avoid liability for maintaining 
inaccurate records.80 The court stated that it makes little sense to 
interpret § 1719(d)’s sanctions for maintaining inaccurate records as 
applying only when a company has physical possession of the 
inaccurate information.81 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit stated, “In the 
context of an online, record-keeping system, a distinction based on 
physical possession makes even less sense.”82  
VII. UNITED STATES FIFTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS REMAND IN COASTAL 
LAND LOSS LITIGATION 
Several coastal parishes filed forty-two lawsuits in various 
Louisiana state courts against numerous oil and gas companies, 
alleging that the companies’ activities contributed to coastal land 
loss.83 The defendants removed the lawsuits to federal courts based on 
several legal theories, but the federal district courts remanded each 
case.84 Later, after the plaintiffs submitted an expert report that 
referred to certain oil and gas activities in the coastal regions during 
World War II, the defendants removed the cases again, relying on the 
“federal officer” removal statute.85 The statute authorizes removal by 
any federal officer who is sued for actions that the defendant took as a 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 233, 235. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 236. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 236–37. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 
2020). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (The federal officer removal statute is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1442). 
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federal officer.86 It also allows private defendants to remove a case if 
they are sued for acts they took under direction of a federal officer.87 
The defendants argued that they were working under the direction of 
the federal Petroleum Administration for War during World War II.88  
The United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western 
Districts of Louisiana disagreed and remanded.89 The district courts 
acknowledged that private individuals can use federal office removal 
when they are sued for actions taken under the direction of federal 
officers, but the courts stated that the mere fact that a defendant’s 
activities are subject to federal regulation is not sufficient.90  The 
courts reasoned that the defendants’ activities were not under 
sufficient control and direction of a federal officer for the defendants 
to be entitled to use federal officer removal.91  
Further, if a defendant does not remove the case within thirty days 
of the first paper that showed the case could be removed, the defendant 
forfeits their right to remove.92 The defendants’ second removal of 
some of the coastal land loss cases occurred within thirty days of the 
plaintiffs submitting the expert report, but it was more than thirty days 
since the plaintiffs had filed their original petitions.93 The plaintiffs 
apparently argued that, even if the expert report provided additional 
details, it was obvious from the plaintiffs’ original petitions that their 
claims were based on activities that occurred over a period that 
included World War II. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the thirty-day 
deadline ran from the date the original petition was served, not from 
the time the expert report was submitted, and therefore a removal 
based on the federal officer removal statute was not timely. The 
 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012). 
 87. See Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 540 
(W.D. La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 88. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 
2020).  
 89. Id. (The actions were filed in state courts in several parishes, some of which 
are in the Eastern District and some of which are in the Western District). 
 90. Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 540–42 
(W.D. La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020); Par. of Plaquemines v. 
Chevron USA, Inc., 2019 WL 2271118, at *9 (E.D. La.), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th 
Cir. 2020). 
 91. Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 546 (W.D. 
La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020); Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, 
Inc., 2019 WL 2271118, at *17 (E.D. La.), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012); Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 
969 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 93. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 
2020). 
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Western District rejected that argument,94 but the Eastern District 
agreed with the defendants that the removal based on the federal 
officer removal statute was not timely.95  
Certain defendants appealed the district courts’ remand orders to the 
United States Fifth Circuit.96 After a case is removed from state to 
federal court, a federal district court order remanding the case is 
generally not appealable.97 But when a case is removed based on 
federal officer removal, a remand order is appealable.98 The 
defendants in the coastal land loss case appealed the district court’s 
second remand to the United States Fifth Circuit, but the appellate 
court affirmed.99 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the thirty-day 
deadline to remove ran from the date the original petition was served, 
not from the time the expert report was submitted.100 Therefore, the 
defendants’ second removal was not timely.101 
 
 
 94. Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 539 (W.D. 
La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 95. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2019 WL 2271118, at *7 (E.D. 
La.), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 96. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 
2020). 
 97. Id. at 506. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 506–7. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 507. 
